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4ABSTRACT
Time-of-day (peak-load) pricing of electricity is an indirect form
of load management that prices electricity according to differences in
the cost of supply by time of day and season of year. It reflects the costs
in a more accurate manner than do the traditional block rate structures,
as it logically stems from the marginal cost pricing theory, yet is
compatible with the historical accounting costs. It has long been argued
and advocated that the sale of electricity and other services, in which
periodic variations in demand are jointly met by a common plant of
fixed capacity, should be at time-differential tariffs. Despite a very rich
tradition of modeling, theoretical refinements in peak load pricing have
not attracted much attention of late. The present study seeks to model
seasonal time-of-day pricing of electricity for two types of power systems
– pure hydro and hydro-thermal under four structural welfare assumptions
– first-best, second-best, monopoly and constrained monopoly, in
conditions of both determinism and uncertainty.
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5 “I shall make electricity so cheap that
only the rich can afford to burn candles.”
- Thomas Alva Edison
1. Introduction
Three distinct functions are involved in supplying electricity in
its usable form to the customers: generation, transmission and
distribution, corresponding to production, transportation to market and
retail distribution of many other products, the chief differences being
that i) electricity moves from the generator to the end-use equipment in
a continuous flow at a speed approaching that of light, and ii) it cannot
be stored in its original form.
Generation, the production of electrical energy from mechanical
energy, takes place at central stations normally far away from consumers
necessitating the other two processes of transmission and distribution.
Transmission is the moving of this electrical energy from generating
plants through wire at high voltage to bulk delivery points called
substations where it is transformed down to low voltage ready for
distribution through low voltage lines to individual meters.
There are only two basic sources for driving electric generators:
hydro and thermal. The energy source in hydro-plant is water-driven
6turbines and that in the thermal plant, steam-driven turbines, the steam
being produced either by burning fossil fuel (coal, oil or natural gas) or
by a nuclear reactor.
Electric utility
The electric utility is unique in that its product is one that must be
generated at the instant it is to be used. If the utility has excess generating
capacity, it can usually meet any anticipated demand; but an over-
abundance of excess capacity entails increasing cost for idle hours. At
the same time few products have a greater need for quality and reliability
— cases of brown-outs and black-outs. As a matter of practical economics,
electric power systems are so designed as to keep both the black-outs
and brown-outs within tolerable limits by means of reserves.
One of the very important components of the electric power system
is the customer’s load which varies greatly at random according to time
of day, day of week and season. A graph showing the variation in the
demand for energy along time is called a load curve. From the load
curve is derived load duration curve (LDC) defined as showing the
amount of time that any given overall load level equals or exceeds a
given capacity level. The LDC is one of the most important tools in
electric power system planning and analysis.
Tariffs
Tariff is the rate of payment or schedule of rates on which charges
to be recovered from the consumer of electrical energy are computed. A
number of tariff structures has been designed and put in use with various
types of consumers. Usually cost differences have been the primary
justification for rate structure differences. The traditional approach
involves division of costs into three categories:
i) capacity, demand or load costs,
ii) energy (unit), output or volumetric costs, and
iii)  consumer costs.
7The first of these (‘kilo watt (kw) costs’), related to investments in
generation, transmission and distribution, vary with the speed and time
with which customers use electricity. The second (‘kilo watt hour (kwh)
costs’) vary directly with the number of units generated; they are mainly
fuel costs and operating and maintenance (o & m) costs. And the last are
those costs varying directly with the number of customers served rather
than units consumed. They include expenses on connection, meter
reading, billing, collection and consumer services. Then prices are set
so as to recover historical (accounting) costs over these three categories
with the ‘fair’ contribution from the several customer classes usually
grouped in terms of diversity and load factor.
This backward-looking embedded (accounting) costs approach,
concerned mainly with recovering sunk costs, ignores some very vital
issues especially from the angle of efficient resource allocation.  The
prices should be related to the true value of additional resources required
for an extra unit of supply and this necessitates a forward-looking
estimate, i.e., pricing according to marginal costs (MC), which are
calculated on the basis of expansion plans and operating schedules of
the power system in line with demand variation.
Seasonal Time of Day Pricing
The spectre of rising electricity costs can be held in leash to a
certain extent through load management of electricity usage, including
direct (mechanical) controls on end-use equipments and time-differential
tariffs. Loadmanagement meets the dual objectives i) of reducing growth
in peak load, thus nipping the need for capacity expansion, and ii) of
shifting a portion of the load from the peak to the base-load plants,
thereby securing some savings in peaking fuels. By moving toward
achieving these objectives electric utilities stand to win a cut in operating
and capacity costs, share the gain with the consumers and provide a
partial solution to the country’s energy dilemma.
8Time-differential (peak-load) pricing of electricity is an indirect
form of load management that prices electricity according to differences
in the cost of supply by time of day and season of year. It reflects the
costs in a more accurate manner than do the traditional block rate
structures, as it logically stems from the marginal cost pricing theory,
yet is compatible with the historical accounting costs. Again, compared
to the block rate structures, the seasonal time-of-day (STD) pricing offers
more potential for improving system load factors; its cost-based price
signal motivates customers to modify their usage patterns, which in turn
will move the system toward attaining the above twin goals.
It has long been argued and advocated that the sale of electricity
and other services, in which periodic variations in demand are jointly
met by a common plant of fixed capacity, should be at time-differential
tariffs. Implementation of peak-load pricing involves substantial capital
expenditure in changing meters and increasing customer service as well
as transition costs of moving from one rate schedule to another. STD
electricity rates have widely been in use in some of the advanced
countries for several decades to reflect such peak-load cost variations,
initially for large industrial customers where metering costs constitute a
trivial fraction of the total electric bills.The reforms in the electricity
sector have given a fillip to this initiative as spot markets for electricity
have come up, rendering the price of electricity on the wholesale market
to vary each hour and thus opening up opportunities for electricity
distribution companies to apply a real-time pricing scheme to the
customer. The progress in solid state technology has now introduced
smart meters with many advantages over simple automatic meter reading,
such as real-time or near real-time readings, power outage notification,
and power quality monitoring. The smart meters have now helped these
countries to extend STD pricing to almost all consumers.
What follows is divided into four sections. The next section briefly
discusses the salient features of the generally accepted welfare models
9in the context of pricing: marginal cost or first best pricing and monopoly
pricing and their constrained cases, second best or Ramsey pricing and
regulated monopoly pricing. The third section illustrates the basic peak
load pricing theory and the fourth one goes into the modeling of STD
pricing of electricity for two types of power systems – pure hydro and
hydro-thermal under four structural welfare assumptions – first-best,
second-best, monopoly and constrained monopoly. The model is also
solved for conditions of uncertainty in the presence of outage costs,
included in the objective function of the model. The last section
concludes the study.
2. The Welfare Foundations: A Review
2.1    Marginal Cost Pricing
Historically the use of gross surplus as a measure of welfare1 was
apparently first proposed by Dupuit (1844) while evaluating public
works projects. The concept was developed and extended by Marshall
(1890) and later fructified in Hotelling’s (1932, 1938) proposals on
public utility pricing.2
As indicated above, the traditional measure of welfare used in
evaluating public utility policies has been
W = TR + CS – TC, ….(2.1)
1. Although there have been detractors (e.g., Samuelson, 1947; Little, 1957;
Silberberg, 1978; and Bos, 1986), the use of surplus is widespread in
applied welfare economics (e.g., Mishan, 1971 and 1981). Willig (1976)
has given further justification for its use by demonstrating, under conditions
quite reasonable for the utility sector, that consumer surplus closely
approximates the consumer benefit in money terms.
2. Traditional interest in the efficiency issues sprang up from pricing aspects
only. Later on the realm of efficiency concerns has broadened to involve
such considerations as X- efficiency (Leibenstein, 1966) and transaction
costs (Williamson, 1975).
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where W = net social benefit, TR = total revenue, CS = consumers’
surplus, and TC = total costs.
Now TR + CS is equal to the area under the uncompensated demand
curve. Let p(x) be the inverse demand function and C(x), the total cost
function. Then we have,
W=                  ....(2.2)
The chosen objective is to maximize W subject to any constraint
relevant for first-best situation, such as the availability of resources and
the community’s production function.
Maximization of W leads to p(x) = dC/dx, i.e., price = marginal
cost (MC).
One basic deficiency from which our W in (2.2) suffers is the
independent demand assumption (Pressman 1970).With this assumption,
W for each good or service can be calculated separately and their sum
gives the total net welfare:
W              …. (2.3)
When we consider the change in the price of more than one
commodity, the definition of gross surplus is somewhat more complicated
(Hotelling 1932 and Pressman 1970). Let x = (x1, ...,xn) represent a typical
commodity bundle. Also let x(p) = (x1(p), ….., xn(p)) be the n demand
function for x and p(x) = (p1(x),….,Pn(x)) be their inverse demand
function. In this multi-product case the net social welfare at the vector
of outputs x = (x1, ...,xn) would be (2.3).
But in general, because of the substitute/complement property of
products, pi may be expected to depend on the entire output vector x,
rather than just on xi, as in (2.3). For the multi-dimensional welfare
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function with dependent demands, Hotelling (1932) has suggested a
line integral of the form:
                                      …..(2.4)
where o is some designated path connecting the origin
(of n-space) and the output vector.
Two major difficulties now crop up with this formulation. First,
differentiability of W, and second, W, as it is now defined, depends on
the particular path ο  chosen and is thus not unique (Pressman 1970).
Thus an indeterminacy arises with variation of the value of the integral
when the path of integration between the same end points is varied. The
condition that all these paths of integration shall give the same value,
i.e., the condition that W in (2.4) will depend only on x and not on the
path is that the ‘integrability conditions’, invoked from the Independence
of Path Theorem for line integrals,
 ∀i, j, …. (2.5)
are satisfied. Hotelling (1932, 1938) has shown that there is a good
reason to expect these integrability conditions to be met, at least to a
close approximation, in an extensive class of cases (See also Pressman
1970, and Crew and Kleindorfer 1979).
Thus, with the integrability conditions, the line integrals of the
form (2.4) become differentiable and their value, W, independent of the
path σ ; so that the first-order conditions for maximizing W in (2.4) again
lead to marginal cost pricing.
2.2   Second-Best Dilemma
Though marginal cost pricing has got strong argument appeal, it
is not without significant problems. First, departures from marginal cost
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pricing in some sectors of the economy owing to the immutable violation
of any of the competitive equilibrium conditions in those sectors pose
serious questions against thieving Pareto optimality in the other sectors
of the economy. Such violations in the first-best atmosphere accumulate
as what are termed ‘second-best’ problems. Some of the early contributors
on second-best, Lipseyand Lancaster (1956), for example, argue that
“To apply to only a small part of an economy welfare rules which would
lead to a Paretian optimum if they were applied everywhere, may move
the economy away from, not toward, a second-best optimum position”
(Lipsey and Lancaster 1956:17).
Later developments, however, have been more positive. Farrel
(1958), for example, argues that the second-best optimum is likely to be
close to the first-best optimum, implying that price should be set at least
equal to MC, and in the case of substitutes, above MC. It has also been
pointed out that first-best rules may be optimal even with the particular
Lipsey-Lancaster formulation of the second-best problem (see Santoni
and Church 1972; Dusansky and Walsh 1976; and Rapanos 1980). Davis
and Whinston (1965) indicate that in the face of separability or little or
no interdependence between sectors, first-best conditions are optimal
in the competitive sectors even when they turn out to be unattainable in
the other sectors (see also Mishan 1962).
Lancaster (1979) has later on summarized the whole second-best
arguement in the context of the electric utility industry. The small size
of individual regulated industries in relation to the whole economy
entails a very large manipulation of these sectors in order to counter-
balance the distortions of the economy. Since all the regulated industries
could not be under a common control, the alternative appears to be to
optimize in individual sectors.3"Unless a simultaneous second-best
3. This, in effect, seems to take us back to the case-by-case approach of
applied welfare economics used by Meade and others in the beginning of
the 1950s and represented in later and technically more elaborate studies
by, e.g., Boiteux (1956); Rees (1968); and Guesnerie (1975).
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solution is determined for the complete regulated sector, therefore, it
would seem that the next best thing (the ‘third best’?) isto ignore second-
best elements in pricing policy at the decentralized level.”(Lancaster
1979:93).
But still another critical problem remains there – the problem of
decreasing costs even if costless regulation could enforce marginal cost
pricing policy. The traditional approach, as explained above, defines a
natural monopoly in terms of everywhere decreasing average cost curve.
Let AC(x) denote average costs, C(x)/x, and MC(x), marginal costs, dC(x)/
dx. Then it can be shown that dAC(x)/dx = [MC(x) - AC(x)]/x, so that for
any positive output level x, if dAC(x)/dx< 0, then MC(x) < AC(x). Also if
MC(x) is everywhere decreasing (concave costs), then assuming
C(x) ≥ 0, we have MC(x) < AC(x). Thus either decreasing average or
decreasing marginal costs lead to marginal costs being less than the
average. This results in incurring deficits under marginal cost pricing
posing many a problem.4 Attempts to have recourse to taxation for
covering deficits will only lead to significant allocative distortions.
Discussions upon the issue of decreasing costs have converged
on two alternatives, fair rate of return regulation and welfare optimal
break-even pricing.
2.3  Monopoly Pricing
First consider the case of a profit maximizing monopolist who
would set price and output such as to
                      .... (2.6)
4. The very existence of MC pricing equilibria is challenged (Beato, 1982;
and Cornet, 1982). Moreover, the optimality of MC pricing also is challenged
(Guesnerie, 1975; Brown a 2nd Heal, 1979, 1980 a and b); Tillmann,
1981). If the production possibilities are non-convex, MC equilibria may
fail to be Pareto optima. Though many an attempt has been made to find
conditions under which at least one equilibrium is Pareto efficient, there
exist examples showing that even in very simple cases such conditions
cannot be found (see Brown and Heal, 1979).
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This leads to the familiar result that MR = MC, i.e.,
∂R(x)/∂xi = ∂C(x)/∂xi, where R(x) = Σxi pi (x), or from (2.6),
     0, i ∈N = (1, …,n) .... (2.7)
,   i ∈N; …. (2.8)
whereI  is the ‘flexibility’ of pj w.r.t. xi (see Rohifs 1979)
and Ri = pi xi is the revenue from product i. When cross price elasticities
of demand are zero, we get the inverse elasticity rule (see Samuelson
1972), pregnant with price discrimination potential.
Depending on the sign of ∂Pj/∂xi in (2.8), various possibilities
arise; but the usual presumption favours own effects, ∂Pi / ∂xi< 0, to
dominate cross effects, ∂pj/∂xi, such that the second term there would be
negative, resulting in higher prices pi(x) and lower output x than under
MC pricing.
2.4   Regulated Monopoly Pricing
The welfare losses due to monopoly pricing may be limited by
regulating5 the level of profits to some ‘fair’ level, say, high enough to
pay at competitive rates the various factors used, including capital.
Assuming a fair returns, larger than the market cost of factors k, the rate
of return regulation may, in general, be captured in the constraint,
Σ xi Pi(x) – α C(x) ≤ 0,  ....(2.9)
Where α = s/k > 1. Inclusion of this constraint in the above
monopoly pricing model yields the optimal prices,
5. Bailey (1973) and Sheshinski (1971) have examined the welfare implications
of increased regulation.
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     ...(2.10)
where λ is the shadow price of a rupee of profit regulated. In contrast
to the unconstrained monopolist who equates MR and MC, the
monopolist under rate of return regulation sets MR equal to something
less than MC, the deduction being determined by λ and α. The limiting
cases refer to zero profits (λ = α = 1) and to monopoly profits (λ = 0).6
2.5    Ramsey Pricing
The second approach, originated with Ramsey (1927) and
developed mainly by Boiteux (1956) and Baumol and Bradford (1970),
deals directly with the deficit problem by allowing optimal departures
from MC pricing such as to break even. This optimal departure is obtained
by maximizing the welfare function (2.4) subject to an explicit break-
even constraint:
π (x) ≥ π0 (x) ... (2.11)
where π (x) is as defined in (2.6) and π0 is the required profit level.
Assuming the integrability conditions to hold, the optimal, second-
best prices derived are:
   (2.12)
where γ is the shadow price of a rupee of revenue raised. It may
also be written as:
 ,    i ∈N;                                .. (2.13)
6. Though regulation may be able to reduce the abuse of monpoly power, it is
fraught with a lot of knots in the context of privately owned public utilities,
e.g., Averch-Johnson effect (see Averch and Johnson, 1962) and the tar
baby effect. (McKie, 1970). Also see Crew and Kleindorfer (1986, ch.8)
for a discussion on the tar baby effect in electricity regulation in private
enterprise economies.
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where     is the ‘Ramsey number’ and
is the ‘super elasticity’ of xi (see Rohlfs 1979).7 ρ is positive except at
the welfare optimum, where ρ = 0, and the conditions for the profit-
maximizing solution are identical to the above with ρ = 1.
Hence a regulated monopoly under Ramsey pricing regime
behaves as if it were an unconstrained profit maximizing monopolist
faced with a demand curve whose elasticity is inflated by the factor
1/ρ = (1 + γ)/γ.  It must be noted that if we neglect all cross-price
elasticities of demand, the Ramsey price structure reduces to the ‘inverse
elasticity rule’:
(pi - MCi)/pi = −ρ /eii,  i ∈N; ...(2.14)
where eii is the own price elasticity. The price-cost margin of a
product is larger, the smaller the absolute value of its price elasticity.
The normal own-price elasticity of demand being negative, the Ramsey
pricing in general results in positive price cost margins. Under ‘low
pricing procedures’, ρ < 0, and we have the case of negative price-cost
margins. The positive price-cost margins lead to higher prices of price-
inelastic goods and to lower prices of price-elastic goods.
The reverse holds in the case of negative price-cost margins. Thus,
in general, the poor who are comparatively price inelastic are burdened in
the case of positive price-cost margins and favoured in the negative ones.8
7. It should be noted that if we defined the net social benefit function over
the ‘budget space’, the optimal solution would be in terms of the usual
cross-price elasticity of demand, εij, which can be easily interpreted. Note
that ηji ≠ l/ε ij, and the interpretation of Si and therefore (2.13) becomes
complicated. In fact, εij and ηji need not even have the same sign; see
Nguyen and MacGregor-Reid (1977).
8. See, for equity aspects of pricing, Feldstein (1972 a, b, c) and Wilson
(1977).
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3. The Peak-Load Pricing Theory: A Review
Apparently, the first pace of exploration into the basic ideas of
peak-load pricing started with Boiteux (1949) of Electricite de France.9
In the USA it was independently originated by Steiner (1957) and
developed by Hirshleifer (1958) and Williamson (1966). While Boiteux
and Steiner assumed two equal periods, Williamson showed how to
work out with periods of any length. Steiner interpreted his peak-load
pricing results in terms of price discrimination. Hirshleifer, taking issue
with this, suggested that they could be more usefully interpreted in MC
pricing terms.
The additional contributions made include Buchanan (1966),
Turvey(1968 a, b, c, 1969, 1971), Pressman (1970), Mohring (1970),
Littlechild (1970 a, b), Crew and Kleindorfer (1970), Bergendahl (1970,
1974, 1975), and Bailey (1972). The major result common to all these
works is that peak-load price should equal marginal peak running costs
plus marginal capacity costs, while off-peak price equals only marginal
off-peak running costs, since the peak consumers, not the off-peak ones,
are solely responsible for raising the ‘capacity lid’.
The first major extension to the basic model was provided by
Pressman (1970) who synthesized the earlier works by the MC pricing
school (for example, Hotelling (1932), Dreze (1964) and Nelson
(1964))in constructing a peak-load pricing model with time-
interdependent demands and a more general specification of technology.
Crew and Kleindorfer (1971) presented a further theoretical
generalization by looking for the implications of a diverse technology
(i.e., multiple plant types) for pricing and capacity decisions. Dansby
(1975), based on the same technology specifications as Crew and
9. However, according to Ault and Ekelund (1987), the theory of peak load
pricing goes back at least to the work of Bye (1926, 1929), who first
developed the peak load model.
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Kleindorfer (1975 a, b), allowed demand to vary continuously with time
within each of the finite number of pricing periods.
Bailey and White (1974) set up a scenario of reversals in peak and
off-peak prices as enacted by a monopoly, a welfare maximizing firm
with increasing returns to scale, a monopoly under rate of return (RoR)
regulation and a firm with a two-part tariff. Their results implied, inter
alia, that for customer changes of almost the same size, regulatory
authorities with tighter RoR regulations might encourage lower usage
prices to peak business users of electricity leaving the prices to off-peak
residential users substantially unchanged.
Panzar (1976) presented a reformulation of the peak-load problem
in which technology was specified through a neo-classical production
function. The best-known result that optimal peak- load pricing requires
only those consumers who utilize plant to capacity to bear the marginal
capacity costs was shown to result from the fixed proportions
technological assumptions of the traditional literature and not from the
fundamental nature of the peak-load problem.When a neo-classical
technology was specified, it was found that optimal pricing required
consumers in all periods to contribute towards the capacity cost.
3.1 A  Basic Peak-Load Model
Steiner (1957) has adopted the conventional welfare maximizing
approach. He assumes a typical ‘day’ divided into two equal-length
periods, each with itsown independent demand curve. Costs are assumed
to be linear: b is operating cost per unit per period and  β the unit
capacity cost per day. Neo-classical substitutability between variable and
capital costs is ignored. This and the single technology are the critical
assumptions that yield ‘Steiner’s results’ for the finite period case.
Now the welfare maximizing problem may be written as
W   o;                          (3.1)
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where qp and qo are demands in the peak (qp) and off-peak (qo)
periods respectively, with peak period demand equalling capacity, and
pp (qp) and po (q0) are prices in the peak (pp) and off-peak (po) periods
respectively.
The corresponding optimal prices are then given by:
pp = b +  β  and po = b, ....(3.2)
which indicate that peak price covers both the marginal capacity
and operatingcosts, whereas off-peak price just covers marginal
operating costs. Moreover, it is clear that if there are constant costs,
welfare maximization automatically requires the peak price to be higher
than the off-peak one.
3.2 Peak-Load Pricing Under Uncertainty
All the above models assume that demand is deterministic. But in
general, many public utilities face demands that are not only strongly
periodic as in the peak-load model but also stochastic. After the
contributions of the French economists discussed by Dreze (1964), Brown
and Johnson (1969) sparked off a new controversy as to the effects of
stochastic demand on public utility pricing. Brown and Johnson used
the familiar cost assumptions of the Boiteux-Steiner-Williamson peak-
load model, but with a one-period stochastic demand. Their expected
welfare maximization yielded the optimal solution as p = b, in stark
contrast to the corresponding one period deterministic solution of
 p = b + β .
Moreover, there lurked at their optimal solution a possibility of
excess demand to occur frequently. Turvey (1970) criticized10  this low
level of reliability at optimum as implausible, which spurred Meyer
(1975) to reformulate the Brown-Johnson model by adding reliability
10. Salkever (1970) also joined issue with Brown and Johnson in American
Economic Review
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constraints to it; this, in turn, raised a new issue as to determining the
optimum levels of such constraints. Carlton (1977) and Crew and
Kleindorfer (1978) tried on this issue, still leaving much to be resolved.
Rationing in the event of demand exceeding capacity was another
vulnerable point in Brown-Johnson model (Visscher 1973).They
assumed a zero-cost rationing process in accordance with the willingness
to pay of the consumers, which appeared highly implausible. Crew and
Kleindorfer (1976) subsequently examined the simultaneous effects of
a diverse technology, Stochastic demand and rationing costs on the
peak-load pricing policy of an expected-welfare maximizing public
utility. Both uncertain demand and uncertain capacity were considered
simultaneously in a simple model by Chao (1983). He examined demand
uncertainty in a more general framework within which the hitherto
specifications of demand uncertainty, in either additive or multiplicative
form, were seen as special cases. The work took explicit account of the
random availability of installed capacity, a major source of uncertainty
contributing to electricity supply shortages.
The theoretical refinements have not attracted much attention of
late, possibly because the classical framework and the inevitable result
have been taken for granted, and the research interest has shifted from
theory to empirics. However, Pillai (2003) has taken up the basic peak
load model to question the classical framework and its result and shown
that if the off-peak period output is explicitly expressed in terms of
capacity utilization of that period, the result will be an off-peak price
including a fraction of the capacity cost in proportion to its significance
relative to total utilization. Analyzing the implications of the relationship
between reliability and rationing cost involved in a power supply system
in the framework of the standard inventory analysis, instead of the
conventional marginalist approach of welfare economics, he has also
formulated indirectly a peak period price in terms of rationing cost
(Pillai 2002). The present paper is in continuation of these refinements.
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3.3 Empirical Studies on Peak-Load Pricing
As already mentioned, theoretical interest on peak load pricing
has waned over time and given way to empirical analysis of residential
electricity demand by time of use. Most of the published studies have
sought to estimate electricity demand by time-of-day, using data at the
household level obtained from ‘rate experiments’.  During the last three
decades, in countries such as the US (see, for example, Faruqui andMalko
1983 and Faruqui and George 2002), the UK (see Henley 1994) and
France(see Aubin et al. 1995), several demonstration projects on
residential electricityconsumption by time-of-use were promoted in an
attempt to better understand the effects of time-of-day pricing on
residential electricity consumption. Generally, in a rates experiment,
residential consumers of an electric utility are selected randomly and
placed on various time-of-use rates for a time horizon ranging from two
to six months. The electric utilities collect monthly data on the electricity
consumption of each of the selected customers during various daily
time periods, which on aggregation provide a data set on residential
time-of-use electricity consumption. Among the studies making use of
such data set we have on the one hand those undertaken by Hill et al.
(1983) and Filippini (1995a) that analyze the electricity demandby
time-of-use using a system of log-linear demand equations in an ‘ad
hoc’ way; that is, the models do not reflect completely the restrictions
imposed by the neo-classical theory of consumer behaviour. On the
other hand are studies by Caves et al. (1980), Aubin  et al. (1995),
Filippini (1995b), Baladi et al. (1998) that analyze the allocation of
electricity expenditure to peak and off-peak consumption by using
conditional demand system. For an overview of these studies see Hawdon
(1992) and, recently, Lijesen (2007) and Faruquiand Sergici (2008); for
a review on price and substitution elasticities under time-of-use rates,
see Acton and Park (1984) and King and Chatterjee (2003).
Empirical evidences on the response of larger commercial and
industrial customers to real time pricing (RTP) are reported in Patrick and
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Wolak (2001),  Boisvert  et al. (2007),  Herriges et al. (1993),  and  Taylor
et al. (2005). Barbose et al.  (2004) provides acomprehensive overview
on real time pricing  programmes operated by US utilities. On the other
hand, in spite of significant hourly variation in the wholesale market
price, most of the US residential customers are charged a near-constant
retail price for electricity. The first significant effort to introduce real time
pricing, that is, hourly market-based electricity pricing to residential
customers (called Energy Smart Pricing Plan) was developed by Chicago
Community Energy Cooperative in association with Commonwealth
Edison (ComEd) as a voluntary programme with 1500 households in
Chicago in 2003. The four-year pilot Plan demonstrated the potential
benefits of real-time electricity pricing on a limited basis. Its success
paved the way for expanding real-time pricing to all households across the
state of Illinois, starting in 2007. Allcott(2011) evaluates this first programme
to expose residential consumers to hourly real-time pricing and finds that
the enrolled households were statistically significantly price elastic and
that consumers responded by conserving energy during peak hours, but
remarkably did not increase average consumption during off-peak times.
4. Modelling Optimal Time-of-Day Pricing of Electricity
Programming and simulation models are regularly used to compare
the techno-economic performance of different combinations of power
plants and to evaluate the optimal schedule. However, they generally
tend to be impotent in revealing the underlying principles of the optimal
plant mix. To analyze this problem, the marginalist approach has been
widely employed by electric utilities that rely on thermal sources of
power.11   But systems depending primarily on hydroelectric power
have not received that much extent of analysis.12 The marginalist
11. See, for example, the seminal work of Turvey (1968).
12. This may be because, except Canada, most of the industrialized countries
make little use of hydro-power. Bernard (1989) presents a marginalist analysis
of the specific characteristics of limited hydro-power in a Ricardian
framework in the context of Canada.
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approach, however, is constricted in its scope of comprehension in that
it usually reduces the operation of a multi-reservoir multi-plant system
to that of an ‘equivalent’ single composite reservoir.
Equivalent composite representation of multi-reservoir systems
is often used by engineers in evaluating optimal operation of hydro-
electric systems.13  In the absence of a well-knit sophisticated planning
model and of accessibility to solution techniques, and in view of intricate
complications involved in dynamic analysis, such simple, static model
comes in handy with the essential features to be analyzed for structuring
long-run marginal cost (LRMC). Again it is an immediate alternative for
taking into account the stochastic inflows, and it enables the use of
stochastic dynamic programming.14
In what follows we present a simple, static model based, in general,
on Turvey and Anderson (1977, Ch.15) and Munasinghe and Warford
(1982; Ch. 4), but sufficiently modified to incorporate diverse
technology, rationing costs and also soft deterministic equivalents of
chance constraints representing stochastic demand and inflows. The
model is solved for two types of power systems–pure hydro and hydro-
thermal under four structural assumptions–first-best, second-best,
monopoly and constrained monopoly. The model analysis is followed
by the derivation of a simple formula for outage costs, included in the
objective function of the model.
4.1  Seasonal Cost Structure of A Hydro-Power System
The power generation of a hydro-system is subject to two
constraints, viz., the available hydraulic energy (i.e., kinetic energy of
falling water) that drives the turbines and the available installed capacity
that sets a ceiling on the pace of conversion of hydraulic energy into
electric energy.  Given the capacity, hydraulic energy is determined
13. See, for instance,  Arvanitidis and Rosing (1970 a and b).
14. See Neto, Pereira and Kelman (1984).
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jointly by nature (rainfall) and by engineering works (dam, river diversion
and dredging). The seasonality of water inflows entails storages for
impounding water in the wet season to help meet the dry season
requirements. Storage begins and rises with the wet season and once the
reservoirs are full, spilling and/or sluicing occurs and continues as long
as effective inflow exceeds energy demand. Discharge begins as the
latter outgrows the former and consequently reservoir level falls. If the
spilling and sluicing period spans quite long with a likelihood of this
pattern recurring for many years, then the marginal costs of energy in
the wet season will be essentially zero; because, with the energy inflows
exceeding energy demands plus storage, extra energy in the wet season
can be generated just by running through the turbines more water that
might otherwise be spilled or sluiced away, provided there is enough
plant capacity. The operating and maintenance (O&M) costs may
increase a little to make up marginal costs.
In contrast, during the dry season, when energy inflows skimp in
relation to outflows, extra reservoir capacity is required to meet extra
energy demands and the corresponding costs of providing storage
capacity represent marginal energy costs during the dry season. In certain
instances allocating a fraction of the dam costs to the capacity costs
may be justifiable, which, however, may depend on the nature of the
specific case: for example, whether or not more storage is required to
firm up the additional capacity.
Given this picture of supply cost characteristics, if we now
superimpose on it demand for power with its random features bouncing
between peak and off-peak points, we get an optimal schedule of
generating costs.
Now the above model with the system assumptions can be more
compactly and precisely be couched in terms of a marginalist approach.
First we turn to the assumptions designing the load duration curve (LDC),
pivotal to our analysis.
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4.2 Load Duration Curve
Our models consider only independent demands during a period
divided into two seasons, wet and dry, s = w, d. The time-varying demand
for power during each season is represented by a LDC (Fig. 1) which
describes the width of the time-interval, θ, that demand equals or exceeds
a given capacity level q:
q = G(θ), 0 ≤ θ  ≤ T; ...  (4.1)
where T is the total hours during the season. Because of its
monotonicity and continuity, the function G(θ) can be inverted to obtain
the width of the time-interval when capacity level q is in use:
θ = G–1(q) ≡Γ (q), 0 ≤ q ≤  = G(0) = peak load. …. (4.2)
The LDC is broken down into two discrete blocks, t, of power
demand –  peak and off-peak, t = p, o.
Fig. 1: Load duration curve
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4.3    The First-Best Prices
4.3.1  All-Hydro System
The first model considers the ramifications of the state-owned
utility's welfare-commitments for its pricing policy. The mathematical
formulation of the model portrays the maximization of the sum of
consumers' and producers' surplus, given by the integrals of inverse
demand curves less the costs:
where
Qst : demand in season s, period t;
qi: power capacity of the ith hydro-plant (kw);
βi : the corresponding constant annuitized marginal (turbine)
capacity cost;
Ri : peak reservoir capacity (hydraulic energy) of the ith plant (kwh)
ρi: the corresponding constant annuitized marginal capital cost;
qist: power output of the plant i in season s, period t (kw);
bi: the corresponding (output inelastic) constant marginal operation
and maintenance costs.
θst : the length of the period t in season s;
Zst : size of power cut (i.e., excess of demand over power generated)
in season s, period t (kw); and
rs : constant marginal penalty cost of energy demanded but not
supplied because of capacity or energy shortage in season s.
This maximization is subject to a number of constraints. First let
us consider what the French writers call the ‘guarantee conditions’, to
ensure supply, to an acceptable probability limit, in the face of
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contingencies–water shortages in dry seasons, peak-load above mean
expectations, or plant outages. These conditions are incorporated into
the model in two forms: one for peak power supplies and the other for
energy supplies in critical periods. Thus the first one gives the chance
constraint that the capacity will be enough to meet the peak-load at
least 100 per cent of the time:
Pr{Σiqi ≥ Q*} ≥ α
where Q* is the stochastic peak load and 0 ≤ α  ≤ 1.
This guarantee condition is often simplified in practice in terms
of a 'margin of available capacity' over and above that required to meet
the mean expected peak demand, as found by Cash and Scott (1967)
while reviewing the practices in European countries in planning system
reliability. Thus itis expressed as
Σi qi ≥ E (Q*) (1 + PRM)
where PRM refers to percent reserve margin. This constraint may
better be added implicitly to the model, since its effect is tantamount to
interpreting Σqi as actual capacity less an allowance for the risk of peak-
load outgrowing its mean expected value; that is, Σqi is
1/(1 + PRM) of actual capacity which in turn implies that β i s are now
(1 + PRM) times the cost of a kw of new capacity. Hence, hereafter β is
represent these adjusted costs and qis, the available capacities.
The second guarantee condition, relating the energy availability
especially in dry seasons, takes on the chance constraint that the total
power output may be insufficient to meet the instantaneous demand at
most 100(1- αst) per cent of the time:
Pr {Σi qist ≥ Qst,} ≥ αst,  0 ≤ αst, ≤ 1 …. (4.4)
The inclusion of a penalty cost term in the objective function is in
fact a direct effect of this chance constraint likely to be violated, i.e., the
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social cost of the failure to meet requirements. Hence suffice it to replace
this constraint by the following relation:
Σi qist + Zst - Qst = 0, ∀s, t;                (dual variables μst)    …. (4.4')
an equality, Zst being the shortfall.
Next are the capacity constraints that plant output can never exceed
the corresponding available capacity:
qist – qi ≤ 0, ∀ i, s, t; (dual variables Cist) …. (4.5)
The stochastic water flows and storage are captured in a chance
constraint that the energy release during a season plus water in storage
at the end of the period cannot exceed, at least 100αs per cent of the
time, the inflow during the period (corrected for evaporation and
seepage) plus the water in store at the beginning:
Pr{Σi qist θst  + Sis-1 ≤ Iis} ≥ αs,                                 .... (4.6)
where Sis is the water in ith storage at the end of s, lis is water
inflow into it corrected for losses during s, and ≤ αs ≤ 1; all variables are
expressed in kwh.
Conversion of this chance constraint into its equivalent
deterministic form requires information on the probability distribution
of the stochastic inflow Iis. Assuming the probability distribution is
known and its fractiles are completely determined by its mean, E(Iis),
and standard deviation, σIis, and defining kαs by the relationship
F(kαs) = αs, 0 ≤ αs ≤ 1;  where F(.) is the cumulative distribution function
of {Iis – E(Iis)}σIis, the chance constraint may be written as
Σi qist θst  + Sis-1 ≤  E (Iis) + kαs σIis .... (4.6')
which is its deterministic equivalent.
For a marginalist analysis, however, this specification lends little
help; and hence for practical purposes, we qualify the energy  release,
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qist θst, in order to atone for the stochastic impacts of inflow, with a water
availability factor, ωis, which in effect, if lower, imposes a penalty in
terms of higher storage costs. Thus the water balance constraint we
consider is
The last, upper storage constraint, requires that the quanta of water
stored, Sis, can never exceed capacity, Ri:
The last equation when qist  is positive yields seasonal time-of-
use long-run marginal cost per kwh,  μst/θst, and together with the first
one gives the usual first-best solution, P = MC. Assuming there is only
one hydro-plant in the system, an equivalent composite reservoir case,
and Ss and qst are positive, we get the following results.
The water constraint (4.6") is not binding during spilling periods,
s = w, and hence Hw is zero, which is its lower value. From (4.13) we
have, then, during the wet season
                ..(4.14)
.... (4.12)
The Kuhn- Tucker conditions for maximization subject to these
constraints are:
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The capacity constraint (4.5) is not binding during the off-peak
period, t  = o, so that Cwo is zero. Thus marginal cost of hydro-generation
during wet off-peak periods is just equal to b, the O & M costs per kwh
involved.
When the capacity constraint is binding so that Cwt is positive in
periods t = p, (4.9) gives  -Cwp = β and hence marginal cost per kwh
during wet peak periods is
                                                        .....(4.15)
The upper storage constraint (4.7) may be binding for several
successive periods of spilling; but Xw  will be positive only for the last
of these spilling periods because extra reservoir capacity is useful only
if it provides more water for discharge. Hence, if d + 1 is the first draw
down (discharge) period, then from (4.10) we get Hd = Xd-1, ('.' Hd-1 =  0).
As Xs is positive only in d-1, (4.11) gives ρ  = -Xd-1, so that -Hd = ρ. Hence
in the dry off-peak periods, marginal cost per kwh is
                               .... (4.16)
i.e., the unit 0 &M cost plus the annuitized cost per kwh of storage
capacity weighted by the water availability factor. In contrast, in the dry
peak period - Cdp = β  and hence
                                                  ... (4.17)
4.3.2    Hydro-Thermal System
Now we will find out the rules for optimal plant mix and the
corresponding prices when there are two plants in the system. This will
be such as to be in keeping with the direction of our empirical exercise
(in the next chapter), so that we assume that a thermal plant is added to
our system with a single representative reservoir. Thermal plant will be
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used in the dry season continuously on base-load operation with hydro
meeting the peak; and vice-versa in the wet season. Such a specification
entails new definitions for some of the elements in our earlier model. Let
us denote the sets of hydro and thermal plants by h and f respectively;
then our generalized model (4.3) becomes
where bi, i ∈h, f, are now O & M costs for hydro plants and fuel
costs plus O & M costs for thermal plants. It needs no mention that the
water balance constraints apply only to the hydro-plants. Hence the last
of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions may be rewritten more specifically as
Now let us consider the system with two plants, one hydro (h) and
one thermal (f), in the dry season, assuming qidt > 0, i = h, f. Then,
eliminating μdt and substituting for Cidt, i = h, f, and for Hid, i = h, in the
above equations, we get the familiar rules for optimal load scheduling.
To be specific,
                               .... (4.18)
i.e., the marginal generating cost should be equal at the optimum
for both the plants. More precisely, it requires that the marginal capacity
cost per kwh saved if hydro-plant were used instead of thermal, should be
equal to the savings in marginal running cost per kwh if thermal were
operated instead of hydro. It also implies that if the hydro-plant has cheaper
marginal running cost, then it should be more expensive to construct.
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Note that the R.H.S in (4.18) is the optimal price (= MC) per kwh
in the dry off-peak period for a single hydro-plant system. Hence on the
strength of the economic rationale that extra thermal capacity means
commensurately less hydro-capacity in need and therefore a saving in
its cost, the L.H.S. in (4.18) may be taken as the marginal cost per kwh in
the dry off-peak period for the hydro-thermal system15.   And in the peak
period, as we know, the MC per kwh will be higher by βh/θdp, i.e.,
In other words, peak-load operation of the hydro requires a capacity
1/θdo less than its peak capacity, but no additional hydraulic power, the
decrease being compensated for by the thermal with extra fuel provisions.
That is, as (4.19") indicates,16  it is possible for adding one kw of hydro-
capacity to be used during θdp hours without extra hydraulic energy.
Since hydraulic energy remains the same, this leaves  θdp /θdo  of a
hydro-plant without hydraulic energy during θdo hours, so that the net
capacity increase is only 1–θdp /θdo with no change in energy. To counter
this deficiency, however, both capacity, (θdp /θdo kw) and energy,
(θdp kwh) provisions are required for the thermal.
Now it is straightforward to find out the marginal costs in the wet
season, when hydro will be continuously on base-load operation and
thermal on the peak. The same logic as above yields an off-peak price in
15. See Turvey and Anderson (1977, Ch. 15).
16. For a similar result for two hydro-power‘sites’, see Bernard (1989).
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terms of i) cost savings if thermal were used instead of hydro, plus ii)
O & M costs of hydro, (the sum to be equal to thermal fuel costs). The
peak price is obtained by adding to it, the marginal annuitized thermal
capacity costs per unit.
Below we tabulate the first-best seasonal time-of-day (SID) prices per
kwh of electricity for an all-hydro (single representative reservoir) system
and a hydro-thermal (one hydro-one thermal: both representative) system:
4.4   The Monopoly Prices
Our second model is set to look for the pricing implications of the
utility's objective ingrained in its monopoly status to maximize profit
rather than welfare. The relevant objective function is
Π = Σs Σt  Pst Qst   –  COST,                ... (4.20)
where  Π   denotes profit and COST refers to the cost terms in parentheses
in (4.3) for a pure hydro system and in (4.3') for a hydro-thermal one. The
maximization subject to the relevant production constraints we have
considered earlier - (4.4) to (4.7) - yields the monopoly prices which we
tabulate below for our two systems:
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where est, s = w, d; t = o, p; is the price elasticity of demand in season s,
period t.
As usual, monopoly price attaches an elasticity term to the welfare
price and is hence pregnant with price discrimination potential.
Depending upon the degree of the period elasticity and marginal capacity
cost per kwh, there is a possibility of pricing reversals, as found by
Bailey and White (1974).
4.5.  The Ramsey Prices
Our constant cost model ensures under the marginal cost pricing
rule that the utility just exactly breaks even. The guidelines laid down
by the Venkataraman Committee characterize the Electricity Boards in
effect as commercial-cum-service organizations and require them not
merely to break-even, but also to generate a surplus after meeting all
expenses properly chargeable to revenues, including O & M expenses,
taxes, depreciation and interest.(Government of Kerala 1984:
33-34). Hence we add to the welfare function model an additional
constraint of the following form:
Π  ≥ Π0  (dual variables γ),               .... (4.21)
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where Π  is as in (4.20) and Π0  is some desired profit level. The
maximization of the welfare function [(4.3)/(4.3')] subject to the relevant
production constraints, (4.4) – (4.7), and the profit level constraint (4.21)
gives the following second-best prices for our two simple systems.
Here the prices equal marginal costs inflated with weights imposed
by the profit level constraint as well as the price-elasticity of period demand.
These Ramsey prices warrant that the price-cost margin for each period is
proportional to the marginal deficit (MR less MC) incurred in that period.17
The Bailey - White pricing reversal possibility appears here also.
4.6.   Constrained Monopoly Prices
It needs no note that care should be taken to reduce the abuse of
monopoly motive to push up the prices beyond certain levels and thus
to safeguard the socio-economic development. At the same time the
17. Cf. Baumol and Bradford (1970) and Boiteux (1949, 1956). Our profit-
ensuring pricing rules are reminiscent of those in the general model of
optimal departures from marginal cost pricing to deal with the deficit dilemma
in the context of increasing returns in capacity provision.
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utility should strive to reap a reasonable return on its capital. Hence on
the assumption of a fair return, s, larger than the market cost of capital, k,
the monopoly behaviour (4.20) may be constrained under a rate of return
regulation of the form:
where α = s/k > 1, and the superscript i should be defined in
accordance with whether the system is pure hydro or hydro-thermal one
(cf. Averch and Johnson (1962)).
Maximizing profit subject to the original set of constraints,
(4.4) –  (4.7), and (4.22), we get the following time-varying prices for our
two systems under consideration:
First let us consider the hydro system; a surprise springs up in that
the rate of return regulation appears not to affect the off-peak pricing
policy of the utility, if cross-elasticity effects are zero, as the off-peak
prices under rate of return regulation in both the seasons are identical to
those obtained for a profit-maximizing monopoly. All the onus of
regulation falls on the peak prices.
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In the case of hydro-thermal system the off-peak prices also bear
the burden, as they are expressed in terms of capacity cost savings.
Except for pure hydro off-peak periods, regulation sets MR equal to
something less than MC; and thus the period prices, except the hydro
off-peak ones, under rate-of-return regulation are lower than those of an
unconstrained profit maximizer.
Comparing the prices under these four models, it is clear that, as
expected, the monopoly prices constitute the upper bound of the price
domain and the first best prices form the floor except when a higher
value of  λ  is imposed upon the regulated monopoly. Between these lie
other model prices, given enough flexibility for the concerned constraint
to exert itself upon the respective model. Thus a very high value of λ
(low γ ) tends to constrict the constraint driving prices to the minimum.
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So far we have assumed zero power cut. When Zst is positive,
(4.12) gives the marginal penalty cost, rs, s = w, d, of supply in-swerving
from demand orbit. In the next section we derive a simple formula for
this outage cost and proceed to tabulate the seasonal rationing price
structure under the four model assumptions.
4.7    Outage Costs: Pricing under Uncertainty
For convenience we deal with a pricing period in terms of a season
divided into different time blocks. The energy demand in a given period t is
assumed to be a continuous function of price, Pt, and a measurable function
of the outcome of a random event. Also it is assumed to be independent of
other period demands and is represented in additive form as
Dt(Pt, Ut) = Q t (Pt) + Ut,                .... (4.23)
whereQ t (.) stands for mean demand in period t and Ut is a random
variable with E(Ut) = 0.
The gross benefit of electricity consumption is denoted by
Wt(Qt, Ut), assumed to be an increasing concave function of the energy
demand Qt. The willingness to pay of the consumers can then be
represented by the derivative of Wt(..), which should be equal to energy
price at a consumption level of Dt(..); i.e.,
W't {Dt (..)} = Pt,                .... (4.24)
We retain the conventional capacity and energy costs and ordering
of the n-technology model. In the face of outages and monsoon failure,
it is the available capacity that is of more practical significance. Let the
available capacity vector be denoted by  where
ai is the availability of the ith plant of installed capacity qi. The total
available capacity of plants 1, ... ,i is then given by
              .... (4.25)
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Since the power supply cannot exceed the available capacity, the
actual power output in any period is
Qt (Pt , Ut , Zn )  =  Min{Dt (..), Zn}                .... (4.26)
That demand is stochastic portends supply shortages and entails
rationing costs.18  For simplicity we assume a linear outage cost with a
constant marginal outage cost of r per unit of energy.19
The model seeks to maximize the expected net social welfare w
defined as
w = expected social welfare – capacity costs – expected energy
costs – expected outage costs. That is,
From the conventional concepts of ordering and total costs, it
follows that plant i will be used in period t precisely when
18. For a detailed discussion on rationing costs, see Crew and Kleindorfer
(1986, Ch.4,6).
19. See Turvey and Anderson (1977, Ch. 14).
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i.e., the probability that demand does not exceed the available
capacity of the first j types, Zj.
Rewriting (4.31) for i = n, we get
            .... (4.33)
which gives an explicit relationship between outage costs and
optimal reliability criterion. The LHS of (4.33) is by definition, the loss
of load probability (LOLP),the probability or the expected fraction of
time that demand exceeds the available supply. From (4.33) we get
               ... (4.34)
the desired explicit expression for outage costs. It is evident that
the higher the reliability level insisted upon, the higher the outage
costs to stand.
Now we tabulate below the seasonal rationing prices yielded by
(4.8), (4.12) and (4.34) for the two power systems under the four structural
assumptions (with the additional constraints).1




ii)   Monopoly Model




Note that the outage costs are with respect to the peak- load units
and that the elasticity terms are the peak period ones.
Conclusion
It has long been advocated that the sale of electricity and other
services, in which periodic variations in demand are jointly met by a
common plant of fixed capacity, should be at time-differential tariffs.
Despite a very rich tradition of modeling, theoretical refinements in
peak load pricing have not attracted much attention of late. The present
study has sought to model seasonal time-of-day pricing rules for
electricity for two types of power systems - pure hydro and hydro-thermal
in normal and exigent conditions under the various umbrellas of
assumptions in the first-best, second-best, monopoly and constrained
monopoly domains.  These simple, static rules appear to be well-adapted
for less developed power systems, and in the face of inaccessibility of
computerized dynamic models, capable of being applied to actual tariff
estimation.
43
Vijayamohanan Pillai  N  is Associate Professor
at the Centre for Development Studies,
Thiruvananthapuram. His research interests
include Public Utility (Energy) Economics,





Acton, J.P. and. Park, R.E (1984), ‘Projecting Response to Time-of-Day
Electricity Rates’, RAND Report N-2041-MD.
Allcott, Hunt (2011), ‘Rethinking Real-time Electricity Pricing’,
Resource and Energy Economics 33 (1) 820–842
Arvanitidis, N.V., and Rosing, J., (1970a), ‘Composite Representation
of a Multi-reservoir Hydro-electric Power System’, IEEE
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems. Vol. PAS-90,
February.
Arvanitidis, N.V. and Rosing, J. (1970b), ‘Optimal Operation of a Multi-
reservoir System Using Composite Representation’, (ibid).
Aubin, C. et al. (1995), ‘Real-Time Pricing of Electricity for Residential
Customers’, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, pp. 171-191.
Ault, Richard W. and Robert B. Ekelund Jr. (1987), ‘The Problem of
Unnecessary Originality in Economics,’ Southern Economic
Journal, 53 (3): 650-61.
Averch, H., and Johnson, L.L. (1962), ‘Behaviour of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint’ American Economic Review, 52,
December, pp. 1052-69.
Bailey, E.E., (1972), ‘Peak Load Pricing Under Regulatory Constraint’,
Journal of Political Economy, 80, July/August, pp. 662-679.
Bailey, E.E., (1973), Economic Theory of Regulatory Constraint,
Lexington Books, D.C. Heath.
Bailey, E.E., and White, L.J., (1974), ‘Reversals in Peak and Off-Peak
Prices’, Bell Journal of Economics 5,1, Spring, pp. 75-92.
Baladi, M.S., Herriges, J.A. and Sweeney, T.J. (1995), ‘Residential
Response to Voluntary Time-of-use Electricity Rates’, Resource
and Energy Economics, 20, pp. 225-244.
45
Barbose, G., Goldman, C., Neenan, B., (2004), ‘A Survey of Utility
Experience with Real-time Pricing’. Working Paper, Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, December.
Baumol, W.J., and Bradford, D., (1970), ‘Optimal Departures from
Marginal Cost Pricing’,  American  Economic Review, 60, pp.
265-83.
Beato, P., (1982), ‘The  Existence  of  Marginal  Cost  Pricing  Equilibria
with Increasing Returns’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97,
pp. 669-88.
Bergendahl, G., (1970), ‘Marginal Cost Pricing with Joint Costs:
Comment’, Research Report No.52, Department of Business
Administration, Stockholm University, Stockholm.
Bergendahl, G., (1974), ‘Optimal Pricing Policies for Good when
Reaction to Price Changes Occur Gradually’, Working Paper 74-
47, October., European Institute for Advanced Studies in
Management, Brussels.
Bergendahl, (1975), ‘Investment and Operation of Electricity- III:
Principles for Pricing Peak and Off-peak Load’, Working Paper
75-10, February, European Institute for Advanced Studies  in
Management, Brussels.
Bernard, Jean-Thomas, (1989), ‘A Ricardian Theory of Hydro-Electric
Power Development: Some Canadian Evidence’, Canadian
Journal of Economics, 22, 2, pp. 328-39.
Boisvert, R.N., Cappers, P., Goldman, C., Neenan, B., Hopper, N., (2007),
‘Customer Response to RTP in Competitive Markets: A Study of
Niagara Mohawk’s Standard Offer Tariff’, The Energy Journal
28 (January (1)), 53–74.
Boiteux, Marcel, (1949), ‘La tarification des demandes en pointe:
application de la theorie de la vente au wilt marginal’, Revue
Generale de l’Electricite, 58, Aug., pp. 321-40; translated as
46
‘Peak-Load Pricing’, Journal of Business, April, 1960, 33, pp.
157-79.
Boiteux, M., (1956), ‘Sur la gestion des monopoles publics astrients a 1’
equilibre budgetaire’, Econometrica, 24, January, pp. 22-40;
translated as ‘On the Management of Public Monopolies Subject
to Budgetary Constraints’, Journal of Economic Theory, 3,
September, 1971, pp. 219-40.
Bös, D., (1986), Public Enterprise Economics, North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
Brown, B. Jr., and Johnson, M.B., (1969), ‘Public Utility Pricing and
Output Under Risk’, American Economic Review, 59, March, pp.
119-29.
Brown, D.J., and Heal, G. (1979), ‘Equity, Efficiency and Increasing
Returns’, Review of Economic  Studies, 46. pp. 571- 585.
Brown, D.J., and Heal, G., (1980a), ‘Two-part Tariffs, Marginal Cost
Pricing and Increasing Returns in a General Equilibrium Model’,
Journal of Public Economics, 13, pp. 25-49.
Brown, D.J., and Heal, G. (1980b), ‘Marginal Cost Pricing Revisited’,
Mimeo, Econometric Society World Congress, Aix-en-Provence.
Buchanan, J.M., (1966), ‘Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment’,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, August,  pp. 463-71.
Bye. R, T. (1926), ‘The Nature of Fundamental Elements of Costs.’
Quarterly Journal of Economics 41 (November): 30-63.
Bye, R. T. (1929), ‘Composite Demand and Joint Supply in Relation to
Public Utility Rata.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics  4-4
(November); 40-62.
Carlton, D.W., (1977), ‘Peak Load Pricing with Stochastic Demands’,
American Economic  Review, 67, 5, December, pp.1006-10.
47
Cash, P.W., and Scott, E.C., (1967), ‘Security of Supply in the Planning
and Operation of European Power Systems’, Paper presented
in the 14th Congress of the InternationalUnion of Producers  and
Distributors of Electricity, Madrid.
Caves, D. W. and Christensen, L.R. (1980), ‘Econometric Analysis of
Residential Time-of-Use Electricity Pricing Experiments’,
Journal of Econometrics, 14, pp. 287-306.
Caves, D.W., Christensen, L.R. and Herriges, J.A. (1984), ‘Consistency
of Residential Customer Response in Time-of-Use Electricity
Experiments’, Journal of Econometrics, 26, pp.1-2.
Chao, Hung-so, (1983), ‘Peak-Load Pricing and Capacity Planning with
Demand and Supply Uncertainty’, Bell Journal  of Economics
14, Spring, 179-90.
Cornet, B., (1982), ‘Existence of Equilibria in Economics with Increasing
Returns’, Working Paper (IP311, 1982)  University of California,
Berkeley, C.A.; published in Contributions to Economics and
Operations Research, The XXth Anniversary of the CORE, B.
Cornet and H. Tulkens (eds.), The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
1990.
Crew, M.A., and Kleindorfer P.R., (1970). ‘A Note on Peak- loads and
Non-Uniform Costs’, The Economic  Journal, June, pp. 422-30.
Crew, M.A., and Kleindorfer, P.R., (1971), ‘Marshall and Turvey on Peak-
Loads or Joint Product Pricing’, Journal of Political Economy,
79, 6, November/December., pp. 1369-77.
Crew, M.A., and Kleindorfer, P.R., (1975a), ‘On off-peak Pricing: An
Alternative Technological Solution’, Kyklos, 28, 1, pp. 80-93.
Crew, MA., and Kleindorfer, P.R., (1975b), ‘Optimal Plant Mix in Peak-
Load Pricing’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 22, 3,
November., pp. 277-91.
48
Crew, M.A., and Kleindorfer, P.R., (1976), ‘Peak Load Pricing with a
Diverse Technology’, Bell Journal of Economics, 7, Spring, pp.
207-31.
Crew, M.A., and Kleindorfer, P.R., (1978), ‘Reliability and Public Utility
Pricing’, American Economic Review 68, March, pp.31- 40.
Crew, M.A., and Kleindorfer, P.R., (1979),  Public Utility Economics,
Macmillan, London.
Crew, MA, and Kleindorfer, P.R., (1986), The Economics of Public Utility
Regulation, Macmillan, London.
Dansby, R.E., (1975), ‘Peak Load Pricing with Time-Varying Demands’,
Bell Laboratories, Holmdel, New Jersey.
Davis. O.A, and Whinston, A.B., (1968), ‘Welfare Economics and the
Theory of Second Best’, Review  of Economic  Studies, 32, pp. 1- 14.
Dreze, J., (1964), ‘Some Post-War Contributions of French Economists
to Theory and Public Policy, with Special Emphasis on Problems
of Resource Allocation’, American Economic Review, 54,
Supplement, June, pp. 1-64.
Dupuit, J., (1844). ‘De la measure de 1’ utilite des travaux Publics’,
Annals des Ponts et Chaussees, 8; reprinted in Arrow, K.J., and
Scitovsky, T., (1969), Readings in Welfare Economics,
Homewood, Irwin.
Dusansky, R., and Walsh, J. (1976). ‘Separability, Welfare Economics,
and the Theory of Second Best’, Review of Economic Studies,
43(1), February, pp. 49-51.
Farrel, M.J., (1958), ‘In Defence of Public Utility Price Theory’, Oxford
Economic Papers, 10, pp. 109-23.
Faruqui, A. and George, S.S. (2002), ‘The Value of Dynamic Pricing in
Mass Markets’, Electricity Journal, 15, pp.45-55.
49
Faruqui, A. and Malko, J.R. (1983), ‘The Residential Demand for
Electricity by Time-of-Use: A Survey of Twelve Experiments
with Peak Load Pricing’, Energy, 8, pp. 781-795.
Faruqui, A., Sergici, S., (2008), “The Power of Experimentation: New
Evidence on Residential Demand Response,” Working Paper,
Brattle Group (May).
Faruqui, A., Sergici, S., (2009), “Household Response to Dynamic Pricing
of Electricity: A Survey of the Experimental Evidence,” Working
Paper, Brattle Group (January).
Feldstein, M.S., (1972a), ‘Distributional Equity and the Optimal Structure
of Public Prices’,  American  Economic Review, pp. 32-36.
Feldstein, M.S., (1972b), ‘Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing.
The Optimal Two-Part Tariff’, Quarterly  Journal of Economics,
86, pp.175-87.
Feldstein, M.S., (1972c), ‘Pricing of Public Intermediated Goods’, Journal
of Public Economics,1, pp. 45-72.
Filippini, M. (1995), ‘Swiss Residential Demand for Electricity by Time-
of-Use’, Resource and Energy Economics, 17, pp. 281-290.
Filippini, M. (1995), ‘Swiss Residential Demand for Electricity by Time-
of-Use: An Application of the Almost Ideal Demand System’,
Energy Journal, 16, pp. 1-13.
Filippini M. (1999), ‘Swiss Residential Demand for Electricity’, Applied
Economic Letters, 6 , pp. 533–538.
Government of Kerala (1984), Report of the High Level Committee on
Industry, Trade and Power, Vol. III, Report on Power
Development, State Planning Board, Trivandrum, May.
Guesnerie, R., (1975a), ‘Production of the Public Sector and Taxation in
a Simple Second Best Model’, Journal of Economic Theory, 10,
pp.127-56.
50
Guesnerie, R., (1975b), ‘Pareto Optimality in Non-Convex Economics’,
Econometrica, 43, pp.1-29.
Hawdon, D. (1992), Energy Demand, Evidence and Expectations, Surrey
University Press.
Henley, A. and Peirson, J (1994), ‘Time-of-Use Electricity Pricing.
Evidence from a British Experiment’,  Economics Letters, 45, pp.
421-426.
Herriges, J.A., Mostafa Baladi, S., Caves, D.W., Neenan, B.F., (1993),
‘The Response of Industrial Customers to Electric Rates Based
Upon Dynamic Marginal Costs’, Review of Economics and
Statistics 75 (August (3)), 446–454.
Hill, D.H. et al. (1983), ‘Incentive Payments in Time-of-Day Electricity
Pricing Experiments: the Arizona Experience’, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 65, pp. 59-65.
Hirshleifer, J., (1958), ‘Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment’,
Quarterly  Journal of Economics, 72, pp.451-462.
Hotelling, H., (1932), ‘Edgeworth’s Taxation Paradox and the Nature of
Demand and Supply Functions’, Journal of Political Economy,
40, 5, pp. 577-616.
Hotelling, H., (1935), ‘Demand Function with Limited Budgets’,
Econometrica, 3, pp.66-78.
Hotelling, (1938), ‘The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of
Taxation, and of Railway and Utility Rates’, Econometrica, 6,
pp.242-269.
Hotelling, (1939), ‘The Relation of Prices to Marginal Costs in an
Optimum System’, Econometrica, 7, pp.151-155.
Lancaster, K., (1979), ‘The Problem of Second Best in Relation to
Electricity Pricing’, Electric Utility Rate Design Study, 7, August.
51
Leibenstein, H., (1966), ‘Allocative Efficiency Versus X- Efficiency’,
American Economic Review, 56, pp.392-415.
Lijesen, M.G. (2007),  ‘The Real-time Price Elasticity of Electricity’,
Energy Economics, 29, pp. 249–258.
Lipsey, R.E., and Lancaster, KM., (1956), ‘The General Theory of Second
Best’, Review of Economic Studies, 24, 1, pp.11-32.
Little, I.M.D., (1957), Critique of Welfare Economics, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Littlechild, S.C., (1970a), ‘Marginal Cost Pricing with Joint Cost’, The
Economic Review, 80, June,  pp.323-335.
Littlechild, S.C., (1970b), ‘Peak-Load Pricing of Telephone Calls’, Bell
Journal of Economics & Management Science, 1, Autumn
pp.191-210.
Mckie, (1970), ‘Regulation and the Free Market: The Problem of
Boundaries’, Bell Journal  of Economics, 1, Spring, pp.6-26.
Meyer, R.A. (1975), ‘Monopoly Pricing and Capacity Choice Under
Uncertainity’, American  Economic Review,  65, June, pp. 426-37.
Mishan, E.J., (1962), ‘Second Thoughts on Second Best’, Oxford
Economic Papers; 14, October, pp.205-17.
Mishan, E.J., (1971), Cost-Benefit Analysis, Allan and Unwin, London.
Mishan, E.J., (1981), An Introduction to Nomative Economics, Oxford
University Press, New York.
Mohring, H., (1970), ‘The Peak-Load Problem with Increasing Returns
and Pricing Constraints’, American  Economic Review, 60,
pp.693-705.
Munasinghe, M., and Warford, Jeremy, J., (1982), Electricity Pricing:
Theory and Case Studies, John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore.
52
Nelson, J.R., (1964) (ed.), Marginal Cost Pricing in Practice, Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
Neto, T.A. Araripe, Pereira, M.V., and Kelman, J., (1984), ‘A Risk-
Constrained Stochastic Dynamic Programming Approach to the
Operation Planning of Hydro-Thermal System’, IEEE Summer
Power Meeting, Seattle.
Nguyen, D.T., and MacGregor-Reid, G.J., (1977), ‘Interdependent
Demands, Regularity Constraint and Peak-Load Pricing’, Journal
of Industrial Economics, 25, June, pp.275-93.
Panzar, J.C., (1976), ‘A Neo-classical Approach to Peak Load Pricing’,
Bell Journal of Economics, 7, Autumn, pp.521-30.
Patrick, R., Wolak, F., 2001. “Estimating the Customer-Level Demand
for Electricity Under Real-Time Market Prices”. NBER Working
Paper No. 8213, April.
Pillai, N. Vijayamohanan (2002), “Reliability and Rationing Cost in a
Power System”, CDS Working Paper No. 325, March; also
published in Water and Energy International, July – September
2002, Vol. 59, No. 3: 36 – 43.
Pillai, N. Vijayamohanan (2003), “A Contribution to Peak Load Pricing
– Theory and Application”, CDS Working Paper No. 346, April;
also published as ‘Time of Day Pricing of Electricity – A Model
and Application’, Water and Energy International, April – June
2004, Vol. 61, No. 3: 31 – 42.
Pressman, I., (1970), ‘A Mathematical Formulation of the Peak- Load
Pricing Problem’, The Bell Journal of Economics  and
Management 1, No.2 (Autumn) pp.304-26.
Ramsey, F., (1927), ‘A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation’, Economic
Journal, 37. March, pp.47-61.
Rapanos, V.T., (1980), ‘A Comment on the Theory of Second Best’,
Review of Economic Studies, 47(4), pp. 817-19.
53
Rees, R., (1968), ‘Second-Best Rules for Public Enterprise Pricing’,
Economica, 35, August., pp.260-73.
Rohlfs, J.H., (1979), ‘Economically-Efficient Bell System Pricing’, Bell
Laboratories Economics Discussion Paper No.138.
Salkever, D.S., (1970),‘Public Utility Pricing and Output Under Risk:
Comment’, American  Economic Review, 60(3), June, 487-88.
Samuelson, PA, (1947), Foundations of Economic Analysis, Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press.
Samuelson, PA, (1972), ‘Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and
Taxation’, in Merton, R.C. (ed.)., Collected Scientific Papers of
Paul A. Samuelson, MIT Press, Cambridge, M.A., pp.492-517.
Santoni, G., and Church, A., (1972), ‘A Comment on the General Theorem
of Second Best’, Review of Economic Studies, 39(4), October,
pp.527-30.
Sheshinski, E., (1971), ‘Welfare Aspects of a Regulatory Constraint:
Note.’ American Economic  Review, 61, March, pp.175-78.
Silberberg, E., (1978), The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical
Analysis, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Steiner, P.O., (1957), ‘Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing’, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 71(285), November, pp.585-610.
Taylor, T.N., Schwartz, P.M., Cochell, J.E., (2005), ‘24/7 Hourly Response
to Electricity Real-time Pricing with up to Eight Summers of
Experience’, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 27 (May (3)),
235–262.
Tillmann, G., (1981), ‘Efficiency in Economics with Increasing Returns,’
Mimeo., Institute of Economics, University
 
of Bonn.
Turvey, Ralph, (1968a), Optimal Pricing and Investment in Electricity
supply: An Essay in Applied Welfare Economics, Allen and Unwin,
London.
54
Turvey, R., (1968b), ‘Peak Load Pricing’, Journal of Political Economy,
76, January/February.
Turvey, R., (1968c), ‘Electricity Costs: A Comment’, Economic Journal,
78. December.
Turvey, R., (1969), ‘Marginal Cost’, Economic Journal, 79, pp.282-299.
Turvey, R., (1970), ‘Peak Load Pricing Under Risk: Comment’, American
Economic Review, 60, June.
Turvey, R., (1971), Economic Analysis and Public Enterprises, Rowman
and Littlefield, Ottawa.
Turvey, Ralph and Anderson, Dennis, (1977), Electricity Economics:
Essays and Case Studies, John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore.
Visscher, M.L., (1973), ‘Welfare-maximizing Price and Output with
Stochastic Demand: Comment’, American Economic Review, 63,
March, pp.224-29.
Williamson, O.E., (1966), ‘Peak-Load Pricing and Optimal Capacity
under Indivisibility Constraints’, American Economic Review,
56, September., pp.810-27.
Williamson, O.E., (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-
Trust Implications, Free Press, New York.
Willig, R.D., (1976), ‘Consumer’s Surplus Without Apology,’ American
Economic Review, 66, 4, September,  pp.589-97.
Wilson, Leonard, S., (1977), ‘The Interaction of Equity and Efficiency
Factors in Optimal Pricing Rules’, Journal  of Public Economics,
7(3), June. pp. 351-63.
55
PUBLICATIONS
For information on all publications, please visit the CDS Website:
www.cds.edu.  The Working Paper Series was initiated in 1971. Working
Papers from 279 can be downloaded from the site.
The Working Papers published after April 2007 are listed below:
W.P.  446 D. NARAYANA The Pricing Problem of Public Transport in
Kerala,  September  2011
W.P.  445 PRAVEENA KODOTH AND V. J. VARGHESE  Emigration
of Women Domestic Workers from Kerala: Gender, State Policy
and the Politics of Movement, September   2011.
W.P.  444  SUNIL MANI The Mobile Communications Services
Industry in India: Has it led to India Becoming a
Manufacturing Hub for Telecommunication Equipments?
April   2011.
W.P.  443  K. C. ZACHARIAH, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN,  From  Kerala
to Kerala  Via The Gulf;  Emigration Experiences of Return
Emigrants. March  2011.
W.P.  442  VIJAY KORRA, Short Duration Migration in India: An
Appraisal from Census 2001. March 2011.
W.P.  441 M.PARAMESWARAN, Financial Crisis and Kerala
Economy. January 2011.
W.P.  440 P.L. BEENA, Financing Pattern of Indian Corporate Sector
under Liberalisation: With Focus on Acquiring Firms Abroad.
January 2011.
W.P.  439 RAJEEV SHARMA Diversification in Rural Livelihood
Strategies: A Macro-Level Evidence from Jammu and
Kashmir, December  2010
W.P.  438 APARNA NAIR, The indifferent many and  the hostile few:
An Assessment of Smallpox Vaccination in the ‘Model Native
State’ of Travancore 1804-1941. November  2010.
56
W.P.  437 VINOJ ABRAHAM, The Effect of Information Technology
on Wage Inequality: Evidence from Indian  Manufacturing
Sector. September  2010.
W.P.  436 S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, D. NARAYANA, The Financial Crisis
in the Gulf and its Impact on South Asian Migrant Workers.
August 2010.
W.P.  435 ANUP KUMAR BHANDARI, Total Factor Productivity
Growth and its Decomposition:  An Assessment of the Indian
Banking Sector in the True Liberalised Era. August 2010
W.P.  434 BEENA SARASWATHY, Cross-Border Mergers and
Acquisitions in India:  Extent, Nature and Structure. July  2010.
W.P.  433 VIJAY KORRA, Nature and Characteristics of Seasonal
Labour Migration:  A Case Study in Mahabubnagar District
of Andhra Pradesh. July  2010
W.P.  432 K.C. ZACHARIAH S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, Impact of the
Global Recession on Migration and Remittances in Kerala:
New Evidences from the Return Migration Survey (RMS)
2009. June  2010.
W.P.  431 GARGI SANATI, Integration of India’s Financial
Markets on the  Domestic and International Fronts: An
Empirical Analysis of  the Post-Liberalisation Period,
June  2010.
W.P.  430 SUNIL MANI, Has China and India Become more
Innovative Since the onset of Reforms in theTwo Countries?
May  2010.
W.P.  429 T. R. DILIP,  School Educational Attainment  in Kerala:
Trends And Differentials.  April  2010.
W.P.  428 SUNIL MANI, The Flight from Defence to Civilian Space:
Evolution of the Sectoral System of Innovation of India’s
Aerospace Industry.  April  2010.
W.P.  427 J. DEVIKA,  V. J. VARGHESE, To Survive or to Flourish?
Minority Rights and  Syrian Christian Community Assertions
in 20th Century Travancore/Kerala. April 2010.
57
W.P.  426 ANUP KUMAR BHANDARI, Global Crisis, Environmental
Volatility and Expansion of the Indian Leather Industry.
March  2010.
W.P.  425 P L. BEENA, HRUSHIKESH MALLICK, Exchange Rate
and Export Behaviour of Indian Textiles & Clothing Sector:
An Enquiry for Major Destination Countries.  March  2010.
W.P.  424 K. C. ZACHARIAH,  S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, Migration
Monitoring Study, 2008 Emigration and Remittances
in the Context of Surge in Oil Prices. March  2010.
W.P. 423 VIJAYAMOHANAN PILLAI N, Loss of Load Probability
of a Power System: Kerala.  February 2010.
W.P.  422 JAYASEKHAR S, C. NALIN KUMAR, Compliance,
Competitiveness and Market Access: A Study on Indian
Seafood Industry. February 2010.
W.P.  421 S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, V.J. VARGHESE, M.S. JAYAKUMAR
Overseas Recruitment in India: Structures, Practices and
Remedies. December  2009.
W.P.  420 V.J. VARGHESE, Land, Labour and Migrations:
Understanding Kerala’s Economic Modernity, December  2009.
W.P.  419 R.MOHAN, D. SHYJAN Tax Devolution and Grant
Distribution  to States in India  Analysis and Roadmap for
Alternatives,  December  2009.
W.P.  418 WILLIAM JOE & U. S. MISHRA Household Out-of-Pocket
Healthcare Expenditure in India Levels, Patterns and Policy
Concerns, October  2009.
W.P.  417 NEETHI P Globalisation Lived Locally: New Forms of
Control, Conflict and Response Among Labour in Kerala,
Examined Through a Labour Geography Lens. October 2009.
W.P.  416 SUNIL MANI High skilled migration from India, An analysis
of its economic implications, September 2009.
58
W.P.  415 SUNIL MANI Has India Become more Innovative Since
1991? Analysis of the Evidence and Some Disquieting
Features,  September 2009.
W.P.  414 WILLIAM JOE, PRIYAJIT SAMAIYAR, U. S. MISHRA
Migration and Urban Poverty in India Some Preliminary
Observations, September 2009.
W.P.  413  K. N. NAIR, T.P. SREEDHARAN, M. ANOOPKUMAR, A
Study of National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme
in Three Grama Panchayats of Kasaragod District,
August  2009
W.P.  412 B.S. SURAN, D. NARAYANA, The Deluge of Debt:  Under-
standing the Financial Needs of Poor Households. July 2009
W.P.  411 K. NAVANEETHAM ,  M. KABIR , C.S. KRISHNAKUMAR
Morbidity Patterns in Kerala: Levels and Determinants.
April 2009.
W.P.  410 ARINDAM BANERJEE, Peasant Classes, Farm Incomes
and Rural Indebtedness: An Analysis of Household
Production Data from two States.  March  2009.
W.P. 409 SUNIL MANI, The Growth of Knowledge-intensive
Entrepreneurship in India, 1991-2007 Analysis of its
Evidence and the Facilitating Factors. February, 2009
W.P. 408 M. S. HARILAL, Home to Market:  Responses, Resurgence
and Transformation of Ayurveda from 1830s to 1920.
November  2008
W.P. 407 HRUSHIKESH MALLICK, Do Remittances Impact the
Economy ? Some Empirical Evidences from a Developing
Economy. October 2008.
W.P. 406 K.C.ZACHARIAH, S.IRUDAYA RAJAN, Costs of Basic
Services in Kerala, 2007, Education, Health, Childbirth and
Finance (Loans)  September 2008.
W.P. 405 SUNIL MANI Financing of industrial innovations in India
How effective are tax incentives for R&D? August  2008.
W.P. 404 VINOJ ABRAHAM Employment Growth in Rural India:
Distress Driven? August  2008.
59
W.P. 403 HRUSHIKESH MALLICK, Government Spending, Trade
Openness and Economic Growth in India: A Time Series
Analysis. July  2008.
W.P. 402 K. PUSHPANGADAN,  G. MURUGAN,  Dynamics of Rural
Water Supply in Coastal Kerala:  A Sustainable Development
View, June   2008
W.P. 401 K. K. SUBRAHMANIAN, SYAM PRASAD, Rising Inequality
With  High Growth Isn't this Trend Worrisome? Analysis of
Kerala Experience, June   2008
W.P. 400 T.R. DILIP, Role Of Private Hospitals in Kerala: An
Exploration, June   2008
W.P. 399 V. DHANYA, Liberalisation of Tropical  Commodity Market
and  Adding-up Problem: A Bound Test Approach,  March
2008
W.P. 398 P. MOHANAN PILLAI,  N. SHANTA,  ICT and Employment
Promotion Among Poor Women: How can we Make it
Happen?  Some Reflections on Kerala's Experience.
February  2008.
W.P. 397 K.N.NAIR, VINEETHA MENON, Distress Debt and Suicides
among Agrarian Households: Findings from three Village
Studies in Kerala. December  2007
W.P. 396 K.N.NAIR, C.P. VINOD, VINEETHA MENON,
Agrarian Distress and  Livelihood Strategies: A Study
in Pulpalli  Panchayat,  Wayanad District ,  Kerala
December  2007
W.P. 395 K.C. ZACHARIAH, S.IRUDAYA RAJAN,  Migration,
Remittances And Employment Short-term Trends and Long-
term Implications. December 2007
W.P. 394 K.N.NAIR, ANTONYTO PAUL, VINEETHA MENON,
Livelihood Risks and Coping strategies: A Case Study in the
Agrarian Village of Cherumad, Kerala. November 2007
W.P. 393 S. IRUDAYA RAJAN, U.S.MISHRA, Managing Migration
in the Philippines:  Lessons for India.  November 2007.
60
W.P. 392 K.N. NAIR, R. RAMAKUMAR   Agrarian Distress and Rural
Livelihoods, a Study in Upputhara Panchayat  Idukki District,
Kerala. November 2007.
W.P. 391 PULAPRE BALAKRISHNAN, Visible hand: Public policy
and economic growth in the Nehru era. November 2007.
W.P. 390 SUNIL MANI, The Growth Performance of India’s
Telecommunications  Services Industry, 1991-2006 Can it
Lead to the Emergence of a Domestic Manufacturing Hub?
September 2007.
W.P. 389 K. J. JOSEPH, VINOJ ABRAHAM, Information Technology
and Productivity: Evidence from India's Manufacturing
Sector.  September 2007.
W.P. 388 HRUSHIKESH MALLICK, Does Energy Consumption Fuel
Economic Growth In India? September 2007.
W.P. 387 D. SHYJAN,Public Investment and Agricultural Productivity:
A State-wise Analysis of Foodgrains in India.  July  2007.
W.P. 386 J. DEVIKA, 'A People United in Development':
Developmentalism in Modern Malayalee Identity.
June 2007.
W.P.  385 M. PARAMESWARAN, International Trade, R&D Spillovers
and Productivity: Evidence from Indian   Manufacturing
Industry.  June  2007.
W.P.  384 K. C. ZACHARIAH, S. IRUDAYA RAJAN Economic and
Social Dynamics of Migration in Kerala,  1999-2004 Analysis
of Panel Data. May 2007.
W.P.  383 SAIKAT SINHA ROY  Demand and Supply Factors in the
Determination or India's Disaggregated Manufactured Exports :
A Simultaneous Error-Correction Approach. May 2007.
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  




To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
